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Abstract
We study the problem of finding the worst-case joint distribution of a
set of risk factors given prescribed multivariate marginals and a nonlin-
ear loss function. We show that when the risk measure is CVaR, and the
distributions are discretized, the problem can be conveniently solved using
linear programming technique. The method has applications to any situa-
tion where marginals are provided, and bounds need to be determined on
total portfolio risk. This arises in many financial contexts, including pric-
ing and risk management of exotic options, analysis of structured finance
instruments, and aggregation of portfolio risk across risk types. Applica-
tions to counterparty credit risk are emphasized, and they include assessing
wrong-way risk in the credit valuation adjustment, and counterparty credit
risk measurement. Lastly a detailed application of the algorithm for coun-
terparty risk measurement to a real portfolio case is also presented in this
paper.
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1 Introduction
In recent years counterparty credit risk management has become an increasingly
important topic for both regulators and participants in over-the-counter deriva-
tives markets. Even before the financial crisis, the Counterparty Risk Management
Policy Group noted that counterparty risk is “probably the single most impor-
tant variable in determining whether and with what speed financial disturbances
become financial shocks, with potential systemic traits” (CRMPG [2005]). This
concern over counterparty credit risk as a source of systemic stress has been re-
flected in the historical developments in the Basel Capital Accords (BCBS [2006],
BCBS [2011], see also Section 3 below).
Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) is defined as the risk of loss due to default or the
change in creditworthiness of a counterparty before the final settlement of the cash
flows of a contract. An examination of the problems of measuring and managing
this risk reveals a number of key features. First, the risk is bilateral, and current
exposure can lie either with the institution or its counterparty. Second, the evalu-
ation of exposure must be done at the portfolio level, and must take into account
relevant credit mitigation arrangements, such as netting and the posting of col-
lateral, which may be in place. Third, the exposure is stochastic in nature, and
contingent on current market risk factors, as well as the creditworthiness of the
counterparty, and credit mitigation. In addition, possible dependence between
credit risk and exposure, known as wrong-way risk, is also an important mod-
elling consideration.1 Finally, the problem is computationally highly intractable.
To calculate risk measures for counterparty credit risk, one requires the joint
distribution of all market risk factors affecting the portfolio of (possibly tens of
thousands of) contracts with the counterparty, as well as the creditworthiness of
both counterparties, and values of collateral instruments posted. It is nearly im-
possible to estimate this joint distribution accurately. Consequently, we are faced
with a problem of risk management under uncertainty, where at least part of the
probability distribution needed to evaluate the risk measure is unknown.
Fortunately, we do have partial information to aid in the calculation of coun-
terparty credit risk. Most financial institutions have in place models for sim-
ulating the joint distribution of counterparty exposures, created (for example)
for the purpose of enforcing exposure limits. Additionally, internal models for
assessing default probabilities, and credit models (both internal and regulatory)
for assessing the joint distribution of counterparty defaults are also available at
1Since in general the risk is bilateral, in the case of pricing contracts subject to counterparty
credit risk (i.e. computing the credit valuation adjustment), the creditworthiness of both parties
to the contract is relevant. In this paper, we take a unilateral perspective, focusing exclusively
on the creditworthiness of the counterparty.
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our disposal. We can view the situation as one where we are given the (multi-
dimensional) marginal distributions of certain risk factors, and need to evaluate
portfolio risk for a loss variable that depends on their joint distribution. The
Basel Accord (BCBS [2006]) has employed a simple adjustment based on the “al-
pha multiplier” to address this problem. A stress-testing approach, employing
different copulas and financially relevant “directions” for dependence between the
market and credit factors is presented in Garcia-Cespedes et al. [2010] and Rosen
and Saunders [2010]. This method allows for a computationally efficient evalua-
tion of counterparty credit risk, as it leverages pre-computed portfolio exposure
simulations.2
In this paper we investigate the problem of determining the worst-case joint dis-
tribution, i.e. the distribution that has the given marginals, and produces the
highest risk measure.3 This approach is motivated by a desire to have conserva-
tive measures of risk, as well as to provide a standard of comparison against which
other methods be evaluated. While in this paper we focus on the application to
counterparty credit risk, as mentioned earlier, the problem formulation is com-
pletely general, and can be applied to other situations in which marginals for risk
factors are known, but the joint distribution is unknown. Finally, we note that we
work with Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), rather than Value-at-Risk (VaR),
which is the risk measure that currently determines regulatory capital charges
for counterparty credit risk in the Basel Accords (BCBS [2006], BCBS [2011]).
The motivation for this choice is twofold. First, it yields a computationally more
tractable optimization problem for the worst-case joint distribution, which can be
solved using a linear programming technique. Although not directly in the con-
text of CCR, the Basel Committee is also considering the replacement of VaR with
CVaR as the risk measure for determining capital requirements for the trading
book (BCBS [2012]).
Model uncertainty, and problems with given marginal distributions or partial in-
formation have been studied in many financial contexts. One example is the
pricing of exotic options, where no-arbitrage bounds may be derived based on
observed prices of liquid instruments. Related studies include Bertsimas and
Popescu [2002], Hobson et al. [2005a], Hobson et al. [2005b], Laurence and Wang
[2004], Laurence and Wang [2005], and Chen et al. [2008], for exotic options writ-
ten on multiple assets (S1, . . . , ST ) observed at the same time T . The approach
closest to the one we take in this paper is that of Beiglbock et al. [2011], in
2Generally speaking, the computational cost of the algorithms is dominated by the time
required for evaluating portfolio exposures - which involves pricing thousands of derivative con-
tracts under at least a few thousand scenarios at multiple time points - rather than from the
simulation of portfolio credit risk models.
3Since the marginals are specified, the problem is equivalent to finding the worst-case joint
distribution with the prescribed (possibly multi-variate) marginals.
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which the marginals (Ψ(ST1 ), . . . ,Ψ(S
T
k )) are assumed to be given, and an infinite-
dimensional linear programming technique is employed to derive price bounds.
There is also a large literature on deriving bounds for joint distributions with given
marginals, and corresponding VaR bounds. For a recent survey, see Puccetti and
Ru¨schendorf [2012]. The problems considered in this paper can be characterized
by two important aspects; (i) we use an alternative risk measure (CVaR), which
are provided with multivariate (non-overlapping) marginal distributions, and (ii)
we have losses that are a non-linear (and non-standard) function of the underlying
risk factors. Glasserman and Xu [2014] present a similar empirical approach to
estimating worst-case error in a range of risk management problems; in addition
to discussing the theoretical aspects of this problem, one of the primary goals
of our paper is addressing the numerical challenges arising from worst-case joint
distribution problem.
Haase et al. [2010] propose a model-free method for a bilateral credit valuation
adjustment; in particular their proposed approach does not rely on any specific
model for the joint evolution of the underlying risk factors. Talay and Zhang
[2002] treat model risk as a stochastic differential game between the trader and the
market, and prove that the corresponding value function is the viscosity solution of
the corresponding Isaacs equation. Avellaneda et al. [1995], Denis et al. [2011] and
Denis and Martini [2006] consider pricing under model uncertainty in a diffusion
context. Recent works on risk measures under model uncertainty include Kervarec
[2008] and Bion-Nadal and Kervarec [2012].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 frames the problem
of finding worst-case joint distributions for risk factors with given marginals, and
show how this can be reduced to a linear programming problem when the risk
measure is given by CVaR and the distributions are treated as discrete. Section
3 outlines the application of this general approach to counterparty credit risk in
the context of the model underlying the CCR capital charge in the Basel Accord.
In section 4 a nontrivially numerical example using a real portfolio is provided,
and section 5 presents conclusions and directions for future research.
2 Worst-Case Joint Distribution Problem
Let Y and Z be two vectors of risk factors. We assume that the multi-dimensional
marginals of Y and Z, denoted by FY (
−→y ) and FZ(−→z ) respectively, are known,
but that the joint distribution of (Y, Z) is unknown (Note: in the context of
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counterparty credit risk management discussed in the next section, Y and Z will
be vectors of market and systematic credit factors respectively). Portfolio losses
are defined to be L = L(Y, Z), where in general this function can be non-linear.
We are interested in determining the joint distribution of (Y, Z) that maximizes
a given risk measure ρ:
max
F(FY ,FZ)
ρ (L(Y, Z)) (1)
where F(FY , FZ) is the Fre´chet class of all possible joint distributions of (Y, Z)
matching the previously defined marginal distributions FY and FZ . More ex-
plicitly, for any joint distribution FY Z ∈ F(FY , FZ) we have Πy{FY Z} = FY and
Πz{FY Z} = FZ , where Π.{.} denote the projections that take the joint distribution
to its (multi-variate) marginals. While we are mainly interested in the application
aspect of this, we note that bounds on instrument prices can be derived within
the above formulation by taking the risk measure to be the expectation operator.
It is well known that given a time horizon and confidence level α, Value-at-Risk
(VaR) is defined as the α-percentile of the loss distribution over the specified time
horizon. The shortcomings of VaR as a risk measure have been much discussed in
the literature. An alternative measure that addresses many of these shortcomings
is Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), also known as tail VaR or Expected Shortfall.
If the loss distribution is continuous, CVaR is the expected loss given that losses
exceed VaR. More formally, we have the following definition of CVaR.
Definition 2.1. For the confidence level α and loss random variable L, the Con-
ditional Value at Risk at level α is defined by
CVaRα(L) =
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
VaRξ(L) dξ
We will use the following result, which is part of a theorem from Schied [2008]
(translated into our notation). Here L is regarded as a random variable defined
on a probability space (Ω,B,F).
Theorem 2.1. CVaRα(L) can be represented as
CVaRα = sup
G∈Gα
EG[L]
where Gα is the set of all probability measures G  F4 whose density dG/dF is
F-a.s. bounded by 1/(1− α).
4G F means G is absolutely continuous with respect to F, i.e. for any b ∈ B that F(B) = 0
we have G(B) = 0.
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Applying the above result, with ρ = CVaRα, the worst-case joint distribution
problem stated in (1) can be conveniently reformulated as:
sup
F,G∈F(FY ,FZ)
EG[L] (2)
Πy{F} = FY
Πz{F} = FZ
dG
dF
6 1
1− α a.s.
Note that the final constraint assumes explicitly that the corresponding density
exists.
In many practical cases the marginal distributions will be discrete, either due
to a modelling choice, or because they arise from the simulation of separate
continuous models for Y and Z. In this case, the marginal distributions can
be represented by FY (Y = ym) = pm,m = 1, . . . ,M , and FZ(Z = zn) = qn,
n = 1, . . . , N . Any joint distribution of (Y, Z) is then specified by the quantities
FY Z(Y = ym, Z = zn) = ψmn, and the worst-case CVaR optimization problem
above can be further simplified to:
max
ψ,µ
1
1− α
∑
n,m
Lmn · µmn (3)∑
n
ψmn = pm m = 1, . . . ,M∑
m
ψmn = qn n = 1, . . . , N∑
n,m
µmn = 1− α
0 6 µmn 6 ψmm
Evidently this is a well-defined linear programming problem, and has the general
form of a mass transportation problem with multiple constraints. Note that since
the sum of each marginal distribution is equal to one, we do not have to include the
additional constraint that the total mass of p equals one. Excluding the bounds,
this LP has 2mn variables and m+n+1+nm constraints. Consequently, the above
formulation can lead to very large linear programs. In the numerical examples pre-
sented later in this paper, we employ marginal distributions with market scenarios
and credit scenarios ranging from 1,000 to 5,000, yielding joint distributions of
O(107).
Specialized algorithms for linear programs that take advantage of the structure of
the transportation problem may well be required for problems defined by marginal
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distributions with larger numbers of scenarios. The reader if referred to Rachev
and Ru¨schendorf [1998] for more information on various types of Transportation
Problem.
3 Wrong-way Risk and Counterparty Credit Risk
The internal ratings based approach in the Basel Accord (BCBS [2006]) provides a
formula for the charge for counterparty credit risk capital for a given counterparty
that is based on four numerical inputs: the probability of default (PD), exposure
at default (EAD), loss given default (LGD) and maturity (M).
Capital = EAD · LGD ·
[
Φ
(
Φ−1(PD) +
√
ρ · Φ−1(0.999)√
1− ρ
)]
·MA(M,PD) (4)
Here Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random vari-
able, and MA is a maturity adjustment (see BCBS [2006]).5 The probability of
default is estimated based on an internal rating system, while the LGD is the
estimate of a downturn LGD for the counterparty based on an internal model.
Another parameter appearing in the formula, the correlation (ρ), is essentially
determined as a function of the probability of default.
The exposure at default in the above formula is a constant. However, as noted
above, counterparty exposures are inherently stochastic in nature, and potentially
correlated with counterparty defaults (thus giving rise to wrong-way risk). The
Basel accord circumvents this issue by setting EAD = α × Effective EPE, where
Effective EPE is a functional of a given simulation of potential future exposures
(see BCBS [2006], De Prisco and Rosen [2005] or Garcia-Cespedes et al. [2010]
for detailed discussions). The multiplier α defaults to a value of 1.4; however
it can be reduced through the use of internal models (subject to a floor of 1.2).
Using internal models, a portfolio’s alpha is defined as the ratio of CCR economic
capital from a joint simulation of market and credit risk factors (ECTotal) and
the economic capital when counterparty exposures are deterministic and equal to
expected positive exposure.6
α =
ECTotal
ECEPE
(5)
5In the most recent version of the charge, exposure at default may be reduced by current
CVA, and the maturity adjustment may be omitted, if migration is accounted for in the CVA
capital charge. See BCBS [2006] for details.
6Expected positive exposure (EPE) is the average of potential future exposure, where av-
eraging is done over time and across all exposure scenarios. See BCBS [2006], De Prisco and
Rosen [2005] or Garcia-Cespedes et al. [2010] for detailed expressions of this.
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The numerator of α is economic capital based on a full joint simulation of all
market and credit risk factors (i.e. exposures are treated as being stochastic, and
they are not treated as independent of the credit factors). The denominator is
economic capital calculated using the Basel credit model with all counterparty
exposures treated as constant and equal to EPE. For infinitely granular portfolios
in which PFEs are independent of each other and of default events, one can assume
that exposures are deterministic and given by the EPE. Calculating α tells us how
far we are from such an ideal case.
3.1 Worst-Case Joint Distribution in the Basel Credit Model
In this section we demonstrate how the worst-case joint distribution problem can
be appliedto the Basel portfolio credit risk model for the purpose of calculating
the worst-case alpha multiplier.
In order to calculate the total portfolio loss, we have to determine whether each
of the counterparties in the portfolio has defaulted or not. To do so, we define the
creditworthiness index of each counterparty k, 1 6 k 6 K, using a single factor
Gaussian copula as7:
CWIk =
√
ρk · Z +
√
1− ρk · k (6)
where Z and k are independent standard normal random variables and ρk is the
factor loading giving the sensitivity of counterparty k to the systematic factor Z.
If PDk is the default probability of counterparty k, then that counterparty will
default if:
CWIk ≤ Φ−1(PDk)
Assuming that we have M <∞ market scenarios in total, if ykm is the exposure
to counterparty k under market scenario m, the total loss under each market
scenario is:
Lm =
K∑
k=1
ykm · 1
{
CWIk ≤ Φ−1(PDk)
}
(7)
Below we focus on the co-dependence between the market factors Y and the
systematic credit factor Z. In particular, we assume that the market factors
Y and the idiosyncratic credit risk factors εk are independent. This amounts
to assuming that there is systematic wrong-way risk, but no idiosyncratic wrong-
way risk (see Garcia-Cespedes et al. [2010] for a discussion). Define the systematic
7In principle we can introduce a fat-tailed copula in place of the Gaussian copula, but with
a considerable increase in the resulting computational requirement.
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losses under market scenario m to be:
Lm(Z) =
K∑
k=1
ykmΦ
(
Φ−1(PDk)−√ρk · Z√
1− ρk
)
(8)
with probability P(Y = ym) = pm. Next we discretize the systematic credit factor
Z using N points and define Lmn as:
Lmn(Z) =
K∑
k=1
ykmΦ
(
Φ−1(PDk)−√ρk · Zn√
1− ρk
)
P(Z = zn) = qn for 1 ≤ n ≤ N
where Lmn represents the losses under market scenario m, 1 ≤ m ≤M , and credit
scenario n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N .
In finding the worst-case joint distribution, we focus on systematic losses, and sys-
tematic wrong-way risk, and consequently we need only discretize the systematic
credit factor Z. We employ a naive discretization of its standard normal marginal:
PZ(Z = zn) = qn = Φ(zn)− Φ(zn−1) j = 1, . . . , N
where z0 = −∞ and zN+1 = ∞. In the implementation stage in this paper, we
set N = 1000, and take zj to be equally spaced points in the interval [−5, 5]. This
enables us to consider the entire portfolio loss distribution under the worst-case
joint distribution. In calculating risk at a particular confidence level, there is
potentially still much scope for improvement over our strategy by choosing a finer
discretization of Z in the left tail8.
For a given confidence level α, the worst-case joint distribution of market and
credit factors, ψmn,m = 1, . . . ,M, n = 1, . . . , N can be obtained by solving the
LP stated in (3). Having found the discretized worst-case joint distribution, we
can simulate from the full (not just systematic) credit loss distribution using the
following algorithm in order to generate portfolio losses:
1. Simulate a random market scenario m and credit state N from the discrete
worst-case joint distribution ψmn.
2. Simulate the creditworthiness index of each counterparty. Supposing that
zn is the credit state for the systematic credit factor from Step 1, simulate Z
from the distribution of a standard normal random variable conditioned to
8Although we have used an evenly spaced grid for discretizing Z, importance sampling tech-
niques can be utilized to better capture the behaviour of worst-case joint distribution in the left
tail.
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be in (zn−1, zn). Then generate K i.i.d. standard normal random variables
εk, and determine the creditworthiness indicators for each counterparty using
equation (6).
3. Calculate the portfolio loss for the current market/credit scenario: using the
above simulated creditworthiness indices and the given default probabilities
and asset correlations, calculate either systematic credit losses using (8) or
total credit losses using (7).
4 Application to Counterparty Credit Risk
In this section we consider the use of the worst-case joint distribution problem
to calculate an upper bound on the alpha multiplier for counterparty credit risk
using a real-world portfolio of a large financial institution. The portfolio con-
sists of over-the-counter derivatives with a wide range of counterparties, and is
highly sensitive to many risk factors, including interest rates and exchange rates.
Results calculated using the worst-case joint distribution are compared to those
using the stress-testing algorithm correlating the systematic credit factor to to-
tal portfolio exposure, as described in Garcia-Cespedes et al. [2010] and Rosen
and Saunders [2010]. More specifically, we begin by solving the worst-case CVaR
linear program (3) for a given, pre-computed set of exposure scenarios,9 and the
discretization of the (systematic) credit factor in the single factor Gaussian cop-
ula credit model described above. We then simulate the full model based on the
resulting joint distribution, under the assumption of no idiosyncratic wrong-way
risk (so that the market factors and the idiosyncratic credit risk factors remain
independent of each other).
The market scenarios are derived from a standard Monte-Carlo simulation of
portfolio exposures, so that we have:
PY (Y = ym) = pm =
1
M
i = 1, . . . ,M (9)
In the coming section we will look at top counterparties with respect to total
portfolio exposure and some of their exposure characteristics.
9Exposures are single-step EPEs based on a multi-step simulation using a model that assumes
mean reversion for the underlying stochastic factors.
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4.1 Portfolio Characteristics
The analysis presented in this section is based on a large portfolio of over-the-
counter derivatives including positions in interest rate swaps and credit default
swaps with approximately 4,800 counterparties. We focus on two cases, the largest
220 and largest 410 counterparties as ranked by exposure (EPE); these two cases
account for more than 95% and 99% of total portfolio exposure respectively.
Figures 1 and 2 present exposure concentration reports, giving the number of ef-
fective counterparties among the largest 220 and 410 counterparties respectively.10
The effective number of counterparties for the entire portfolio in shown in Figure
3. As can be seen in these figures the choice of largest 220 and 410 counterparties
is justified as the number of effective counterparties for the entire portfolio is 31
in each case.
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Figure 1: Effective number of counterparties for the largest 220 counterparties.
The exposure simulation uses M = 1000 and M = 2000 market scenarios, while
the systematic credit risk factor is discretized with N = 1000, N = 2000 and
N = 5000 using the method described above. For CVaR calculations, we employ
the 95% and 99% confidence levels; This has been dictated by our choice of N .
As we mentioned earlier, importance sampling methods would be more suitable
at higher confidence levels. Note that there would be a dramatic increase in the
computational cost of simulating the number of exposure scenarios in this case.
10Counterparty exposures (EPEs) are sorted in decreasing order. Let wn be the n
th largest
exposure; then the Herfindahl index of the N largest exposures is defined as:
HN =
∑N
n=1 w
2
n/(
∑N
n=1 wn)
2
The effective number of counterparties among the N largest counterparties with respect to total
portfolio exposures is H−1N .
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Figure 2: Effective number of counterparties for the largest 410 counterparties.
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Figure 3: Effective number of counterparties for the entire portfolio.
The ranges of individual counterparty exposures are plotted in figure 4. The 95th
and 5th percentiles of the exposure distribution are given as a percentage of the
mean exposure for each counterparty. The volatility of the counterparty exposure
tends to increase as the the mean exposure of the respective counterparties de-
creases. In other words, counterparties with higher mean exposure tend to be less
volatile compared to counterparties with lower mean exposure. Given the above
characteristics, we would expect that wrong-way risk could have an important
impact on portfolio risk, and that the contribution of idiosyncratic risk will also
be significant. The distribution of the total portfolio exposures from the exposure
simulation is given in Figure 5. The histogram shows that the portfolio exposure
distribution is both leptokurtic and highly skewed. It is important to employ
such highly skewed with very fat tail exposure distribution to ensure the proper
conservatism of our method in practice.
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Figure 4: 5% and 95% percentiles of the exposure distributions of individual counter-
parties, expressed as a percentage of counterparty mean exposure (Here counterparties
are sorted in order of decreasing mean exposure).
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Figure 5: Histogram of total portfolio exposures from the exposure simulation.
4.2 Numerical Results
To assess the severity of the worst-case joint distribution, and to determine the de-
gree of conservativeness in earlier methods, we compare risk measures calculated
using the worst-case joint distribution to those computed based on the stress-
testing algorithm presented in Garcia-Cespedes et al. [2010] and Rosen and Saun-
ders [2010]. In this method, exposure scenarios are sorted in an economically
meaningful way, and then a two-dimensional copula is applied to simulate the
joint distribution of exposures (from the discrete distribution defined by the ex-
posure scenarios) and the systematic credit factor. The algorithm is efficient, and
preserves the (simulated) joint distribution of the exposures. Here, we apply a
Gaussian copula, and sort exposure scenarios by the value of total portfolio expo-
sure (this intuitive sorting method has proved to be conservative in many tests,
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Case I
MN = O(106) M = 1000 market scenarios N = 1000 credit scenarios
α min(CVaRsys/CVaRwcc) max(CVaRsys/CVaRwcc)
0.95 52.2% 95.1%
0.99 51.8% 95.9%
Case II
MN = O(106) M = 2000 market scenarios N = 2000 credit scenarios
α min(CVaRsys/CVaRwcc) max(CVaRsys/CVaRwcc)
0.95 50.3% 96.9%
0.99 49.6% 96.6%
Case III
MN = O(107) M = 2000 market scenarios N = 5000 credit scenarios
α min(CVaRsys/CVaRwcc) max(CVaRsys/CVaRwcc)
0.95 44.8% 96.4%
0.99 44.1% 97.1%
Table 1: Minimum and maximum of ratio of systematic CVaR using the Gaussian copula algorithm to systematic
CVaR using the worst-case joint distribution for the largest 220 counterparties at 95% and 99% confidence level.
Case I
MN = O(106) M = 1000 market scenarios N = 1000 credit scenarios
α min(CVaRtot/CVaRwcc) max(CVaRtot/CVaRwcc)
0.95 52.2% 96.8%
0.99 51.6% 96.5%
Case II
MN = O(106) M = 2000 market scenarios N = 2000 credit scenarios
α min(CVaRtot/CVaRwcc) max(CVaRtot/CVaRwcc)
0.95 49.6% 97.2%
0.99 48.9% 97.4%
Case III
MN = O(107) M = 2000 market scenarios N = 5000 credit scenarios
α min(CVaRtot/CVaRwcc) max(CVaRtot/CVaRwcc)
0.95 45.8% 98.1%
0.99 44.7% 98.2%
Table 2: Minimum and maximum ratio of CVaR for total losses using the Gaussian copula algorithm to CVaR for
total losses using the worst-case joint distribution for the largest 410 counterparties at 95% and 99% confidence
level.
conducted in Rosen and Saunders [2010]). For each level of correlation in the
Gaussian copula, we calculate the ratio of risk (as measured by 95% and 99%
CVaR) estimated using the sorting method to risk, which in turn, is estimated
using the worst-case loss distribution.
We present the results of three discretizations of the worst-case joint distribution.
Case I employs M = 1,000 market scenarios and N = 1,000 credit scenarios;
Case II doubles the market and credit scenarios. Lastly in Case III we use 2,000
market scenarios and 5,000 credit scenarios. Note that Case I and Case II yield a
discretized worst-case distribution of O(106) while Case III’s output is of O(107).
Figure 6 shows the graph of the ratio of systematic CVaR using the Gaussian
copula algorithm described in Rosen and Saunders [2010] to systematic CVaR us-
ing the worst-case joint distribution method described in section 3 for the largest
14
Case I Case II
Case III
Figure 6: Ratio of systematic CVaR using the Gaussian copula algorithm to systematic
CVaR using the worst-case joint distribution for the largest 220 counterparties at 95%
confidence level.
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Case I Case II
Case III
Figure 7: Ratio of CVaR for total losses using the Gaussian copula algorithm to CVaR
for total losses using the worst-case joint distribution for the largest 410 counterparties
at 99% confidence level.
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220 counterparties at 95% confidence level. The ratio of the CVaR of the sys-
tematic portfolio loss to the CVaR calculated using worst-case joint distribution
across various levels of market-credit correlation and discretization scenarios indi-
cate that the distribution simulated using the worst-case joint distribution has a
higher CVaR compared to previous simulation methods for the largest 220 coun-
terparties by 4.9%, 3.1% and 3.6% at α = 0.95 respectively when the systematic
risk factor and market risk factor are fully correlated. The difference is larger for
lower levels of market-credit correlation in the stress testing algorithm. The sort-
ing methods do indeed produce relatively conservative numbers (at high levels of
market-credit correlation) for this portfolio. In addition to the results presented
in figure 6, table 1 shows the minimum and maximum of systematic CVaR to
CVaR calculated from worst-case joint distribution at 99% confidence level. Note
that the results are consistent with what we observed at α = 95%.
Similar results for calculating CVaR ratios using the total portfolio loss for the
largest 410 counterparties which constitute more than 99.6% of total portfolio
exposure are shown in figure 7. The graphs are based on a higher confidence
level, α = 99%, compared to figure 6. Table 2 shows comparable results to those
presented in table 1 when we use total portfolio loss instead of systematic loss.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we studied the problem of finding the worst-case joint distribution
of a set of risk factors given prescribed multivariate marginals and a nonlinear loss
function. We showed that when the risk measure is CVaR, and the distributions
are discretized, the problem can be solved conveniently using linear programming.
The method has applications to any situation where marginals are provided, and
bounds need to be determined on total portfolio risk. This arises in many finan-
cial contexts, including pricing and risk management of exotic options, analysis of
structured finance instruments, and aggregation of portfolio risk across risk types.
Applications to counterparty credit risk were emphasized in this paper, and they
include assessing wrong-way risk in the credit valuation adjustment, and coun-
terparty credit risk measurement. A detailed application of the algorithm for
counterparty risk measurement on a real portfolio was subsequently presented
and discussed.
The method presented in this paper will be of interest to regulators, who are
interested in determining how conservative dependence structures estimated (or
assumed) by risk managers in industry actually are. It will also be of interest
to risk managers, who can employ it to stress test their assumptions regarding
dependence in risk measurement calculations.
17
References
M. Avellaneda, A. Levy, and A. Paras. Pricing and hedging derivative securities
in markets with uncertain volatilities. Appl Math Finance, 2:73–88, 1995.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). International convergence
of capital measurement and capital standards: A revised framework compre-
hensive vesion. Technical report, Bank for International Settlements, 2006.
Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.htm.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Basel III: A global regulatory
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems - revised version June
2011. Technical report, Bank for International Settlements, 2011. Available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Fundamental review of the
trading book. Technical report, Bank for International Settlements, 2012. Avail-
able at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs219.pdf.
M. Beiglbock, P. Henry-Labordere, and F. Penkner. Model-independent
bounds for option prices: A mass transport approach. Available at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/1106.5929.html, 2011.
D. Bertsimas and I. Popescu. On the relation between option and stock prices: a
convex optimization approach. Operation Research, 50(2):358–374, 2002.
J. Bion-Nadal and M. Kervarec. Risk measuring under model uncertainty. Annals
of Applied Probability, 22(1):213–238, 2012.
X. Chen, G. Deelstra, J. Dhaene, and M. Vanmaele. Static super-replicating
strategies for a class of exotic options. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,
42(3):1067–1085, 2008.
B. De Prisco and D. Rosen. Modelling stochastic counterparty credit exposures
for derivatives portfolios. In M. Pykhtin, editor, Counterparty Credit Risk Mod-
elling. Risk Books, 2005.
L. Denis and C. Martini. A theorical framework for the pricing of contingent
claims in the presence of model uncertainty. Annals of Applied Probability, 16
(2):827–852, 2006.
L. Denis, M. Hu, and S. Peng. Function spaces and capacity related to a sublinear
expectation: Application to G-Brownian motion paths. Potential Analysis, 34
(2):139–161, 2011.
18
J.C. Garcia-Cespedes, J.A. de Juan Herrero, D. Rosen, and D. Saunders. Effective
modeling of wrong-way risk, CCR capital and alpha in Basel II. Journal of Risk
Model Validation, 4(1):71–98, 2010.
Paul Glasserman and Xingbo Xu. Robust risk measurement and model risk.
Quantitative Finance, 14(1):29–58, 2014.
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group. Toward greater financial stabil-
ity: A private sector perspective. Available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org,
2005.
J. Haase, M. Ilg, and R. Werner. Model-free bounds on bilateral counter-
party valuation. Technical report, 2010. Available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/24796/.
D. Hobson, P. Laurence, and T.H. Wang. Static-arbitrage optimal subreplicating
strategies for basket options. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 37(3):
553–572, 2005a.
D. Hobson, P. Laurence, and T.H. Wang. Static-arbitrage upper bounds for the
prices of basket options. Quantitative Finance, 5(4):329–342, 2005b.
M. Kervarec. Modeles non domines en mathematiques financieres. These de
Doctorat en Mathematiques, 2008.
P. Laurence and T.H. Wang. What is a basket worth? Risk Magazine, February
2004.
P. Laurence and T.H. Wang. Sharp upper and lower bounds for basket options.
Applied Mathematical Finance, 12(3):253–282, 2005.
G. Puccetti and L. Ru¨schendorf. Bounds for joint portfolios of dependent risks.
Statistics & Risk Modeling, 29(2):107–132, 2012.
S.T. Rachev and L. Ru¨schendorf. Mass Transportation Problems: Volume 2.
Probability and its Applications. 1998.
D. Rosen and D. Saunders. Computing and stress testing counterparty credit risk
capital. In E. Canabarro, editor, Counterparty Credit Risk, pages 245–292. Risk
Books, London, 2010.
A. Schied. Risk measures and robust optimization problems. Available at
www.aschied.de/PueblaNotes8.pdf, 2008.
D. Talay and Z. Zhang. Worst case model risk management. Finance and Stochas-
tics, 6:517–537, 2002.
19
